Dynamic cooperation with tipping points in the climate system
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| Published in: | Oxford economic papers |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: | 2017 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpw070 https://search.proquest.com/docview/1878759887 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Dynamic cooperation with tipping points in the climate system |
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| 520 | |a Tipping points in the climate system can stabilize climate treaties; the stabilizing effect, however, often vanishes when the location of the threshold is uncertain. I demonstrate that in a dynamic setting, additional welfare gains can improve the prospects of cooperation. In the model, intertemporal efficiency gains result from abatement costs that are convex in each period. While non-cooperative countries tend to postpone their abatement efforts until the last minute as a result of the free-rider incentive, cooperation allows countries to allocate their abatement efforts efficiently over time. I show that cooperation often improves the outcome substantially, and arises endogenously in the model. In some cases, a 'threshold-equilibrium' emerges, where the stable coalition size is just large enough for the signatories to invest in avoiding the catastrophe. [web URL: https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-abstract/69/2/388/2802639/Dynamic-cooperation-with-tipping-points-in-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext] | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Equilibrium | |
| 650 | 4 | |a International cooperation | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Climate change | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Cost reduction | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Studies | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Environmental policy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Treaties | |
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